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This article uses deliberative forums to examine attitudes to UK welfare futures. It makes 
methodological, empirical and theoretical contributions to the ield. We demonstrate the value 
of the approach, provide insights into attitudes, in particular about priorities and how people link 
ideas together, and show how the UK’s neoliberal market-centredness its with enthusiasm for state 
healthcare and pensions, desire to close national labour markets to immigrants and approval of 
government interventions to expand opportunities for those who make the effort. Findings point 
to the strength of the work ethic and individual responsibility alongside a regret that major and 
highly valued state services appear unsustainable, the construction of immigrants as simultaneously 
a burden on provision and unfair labour-market competitors, and backing for the development of 
a ‘new risk’ welfare state through social investment. The study reveals the complexity of responses 
to current challenges in an increasingly liberal-leaning welfare state.
key words welfare state • austerity • social security • individual responsibility 
Introduction
Welfare states faces severe social, political and economic pressures (Hemerijk, 2013; 
Kersbergen and Vis, 2014; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Taylor-Gooby et al, 2017). More 
speciically, indications of a decline in support for traditional state welfare services 
(Pearce and Taylor, 2013), anxiety about government capacity to provide adequate 
services in health, social care and pensions, stronger concerns about how welfare is 
assumed to weaken work incentives (Clery, 2016) and fears about a perceived failure of 
government to manage immigration (Migration Observatory, 2016) suggest pressures 
for change are strengthening, and indicate a shift away from the collectivist tradition 
towards greater individualism. In this context, better knowledge of people’s attitudes 
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to welfare and their priorities and how they are framed is of value (Svallfors, 2010; 
Larsen, 2008; Mewes and Mau, 2013).
This paper uses Democratic Forums (DFs) to investigate attitudes to the future of 
state welfare in the UK. It is part of a ive-country comparative project on which we 
will report in due course. DF methods are rarely used in attitude research, and not 
previously, as far as we know, in relation to welfare state futures. We seek to contribute 
in three areas: to method, by demonstrating the value of the approach, empirically, 
by using its capacity to explore the justiications that underpin the ‘headline igures’ 
of attitudes to welfare and theoretically by developing the free market individualist 
characterisation of UK welfare state ideology to include the notion of ‘reluctant 
individualism’.
Most existing research on welfare attitudes relies on structured surveys based 
on individual interviews with a representative population sample. These studies 
are valuable in charting attitudes towards social policy, but sufer limitations when 
academic and expert preoccupations not shared by the general public receive excessive 
attention (Goerres and Prinzen, 2011). 
DFs adopt a diferent approach (Carpini et al, 2005; Steiner, 2012; Elstub and 
McLaverty, 2014; Chambers, 2003; Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018): a group 
of people meets for extended discussion of a topic over a period of time. A high 
degree of control is retained by the participants, who frame the issue and pursue 
discussion as they see it with only light-touch moderation. The method is typically 
used in consultations on di cult policy issues (Wakeford and Singh, 2008; Renn, 
2008: ch 8; Elstub, 2015). Here we use DFs rather diferently, as a research tool to 
gain new insights into welfare attitudes. DFs do not permit the degree of statistical 
representativeness often achieved by sample surveys but rather complement them. In 
particular they provide insight into the priorities that people recognise and the way 
speciic themes are understood to link together. 
The ive sections of the article cover: pressures on the UK welfare state, in particular 
the trend towards greater market-centred individualism, the contribution of DFs and 
conventional attitude studies to understanding what people want and expect from the 
welfare state in the future, our method, our indings and discussion and conclusion.
Pressures on the welfare state and the attitudinal response
Many commentators agree that welfare states face severe economic, social, 
demographic and political pressures. These challenges raise the question of how 
far the future of the welfare state will resemble the past and direct our attention to 
understanding people’s attitudes and priorities.
Social class solidarity made an important contribution to the development of welfare 
states (Baldwin, 1990; Marshall, 1950; Korpi, 1983; Ofe, 1984). Recent developments 
at a structural level have fractured the traditional welfare alliances. The transition 
from industrial to post-industrial society, the emergence of a more post-industrial and 
globalised political economy and the decline of the labour movement have shifted 
the balance between capital and labour on which the welfare state compromise rested 
(Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). The traditional redistributive 
settlement has become more unstable.
Welfare states have come under strain during the past three decades from 
demographic change, rising aspirations (Glennerster, 2009) and labour market 
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change, particularly as more women move into full-time employment and skills play 
a stronger role in determining opportunities (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). These factors 
generate demands for childcare and for state support as wages and opportunities at the 
bottom stagnate (Green, 2006). These trends are markedly insistent in the UK. Most 
commentators expect them to continue into the future and to grow more pressing 
(Pierson, 2001; Hemerijk, 2013; Van Kersbergen and Kees, 2014; Taylor-Gooby et 
al, 2017). The Great Recession from 2007 and subsequent stagnation exacerbate the 
problem of funding services (Gough, 2011).
At the level of politics, the ‘fanning out’ of inequalities (Atkinson, 2007) and 
tensions between immigrants and established populations over access to welfare state 
resources create further division (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Triandafyllidou et al, 
2011; Van der Waal et al, 2013). A new populist politics erodes trust in government 
as welfare provider (Kriesi et al, 2012).
Interests, values and institutions are all relevant to attitudes (Chung and Meuleman, 
2017) and in all three areas there is a notable shift towards individualism. The ‘new 
politics of welfare’ school argues that interest cleavages are becoming more complex 
as new concerns gain importance alongside class. These divisions are reinforced by 
the rise of welfare chauvinism and disillusion with government, particularly on the 
part of those who feel left behind by globalisation and economic changes (Kriesi et 
al, 2012; Teney et al, 2013; Hobolt, 2016). The growth of more individualist, less 
solidaristic values is shown by the greater suspicion of unemployed people, concerns 
about immigrants as labour-market competitors and the declining support for 
redistribution and for beneits for unemployed people and the low-waged (Larsen, 
2008; Clery, 2016; Pearce and Taylor, 2013; Baumberg et al, 2012; Baumberg-Geiger 
et al, 2017). Concurrently, private provision is gradually expanding (Hemerijk, 2013).
The UK is often seen as a liberal-leaning welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990) 
committed to a strong role for the market and for individual rather than state 
responsibility (Mau, 2015), and to targeted welfare provision (second highest in the 
EU in means-tested proportion of spending: Eurostat, 2017). Recent policy issues 
include relatively low unemployment but high inequality and high poverty rates, 
major tax cuts and cuts on social care and beneits, while seeking a balanced budget 
and the diferential loading of spending cuts onto the working age population (Lupton 
et al, 2016). These features correspond to neoliberal commitment to a free market 
and individual responsibility. In addition, immigration from the EU and elsewhere 
is high on the political agenda at the time of the ieldwork (Mewes and Mau, 2013) 
with a repeated government promise to reduce the rate from ‘the hundreds to the tens 
of thousands’ (Telegraph, 2010). More generally the UK faces escalating pressures on 
social spending. First, population ageing is expected to increase demands for pension 
spending (from 5.0 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 to 7.4 by 2043–44), reinforced by 
the triple lock on pensions and only partly ofset by pension age rises and cuts in 
short-term and disability beneit spending (from 6.8 GDP to 6.2 per cent) (OBR, 
2014, Table 3). Second, NHS spending is expected to rise from 7.3 to 7.6 and social 
care from 1.1 to 1.9 per cent of GDP in the period, partly ofset by a 0.9 per cent 
GDP fall in education spending (OBR, 2015, Table 3.6). Whether these spending 
increases will be suicient to sustain adequate services is unclear (King’s Fund, 2017). 
Other concerns refer to long-term productivity within both state services and the 
broader economy (ONS, 2017).
Peter Taylor-Gooby et al
4
In such a setting the main expectations in relation to attitudes are: an assumption 
that individuals should be, as far as is possible, independent, providing for themselves 
through work or property, that entitlement should be strictly limited to proven need, 
and that progressive taxation or redistribution should be rejected. The authoritative 
British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey (NatCen, 2017) generally endorses the work 
ethic and antipathy to progressive tax but shows two things: an entrenched division 
between support for the major-spending mass provision areas of state welfare 
(healthcare and pensions) and devaluing of those targeted towards the smaller groups 
of working age population (unemployment beneit and low-wage support); and a 
desire to restrict immigration (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Reeskens and Van 
Oorschot, 2017). At irst sight, both these attitudes cut across neoliberal rejection 
of all state provision and approval of an open and free market in labour. In addition, 
a ‘thermostat’ theory is often applied to attitudes to unemployed beneits: as labour 
market conditions deteriorate the public becomes more sympathetic and vice versa 
(Curtice, 2010). At the time of the study however, attitudes seemed to be moving away 
from this logic. Despite beneit cuts, attitudes to claimants had hardened (Clery, 2016).
These comments lead to four research questions:
1. To what extent do attitudes in the UK follow an individualist market logic?
2. How do attitudes to immigration it in?
3. How does this relate to attitudes to mass services like the NHS and pensions?
4. What are the expectations about welfare state futures?
Deliberative forums and other methods of investigating attitudes
Almost all research on welfare attitudes is based on quantitative analysis of structured 
sample surveys, the great majority on data from four surveys: the European Social 
Survey, the International Social Survey Programme, the World Value Survey and the 
European Values Study (see Svallfors, 2010), and nationally the UK BSA survey (which 
carries modules for the above surveys) used as a comparator for the qualitative work in 
this paper. There is a small body of work using focus groups (for example Burckhardt 
et al, 2011; Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2010). These methods have substantial strengths 
and the quantitative work in particular has stimulated a growing body of academic 
research by generating and making available cross-nationally comparable data.
The quantitative approach inds it di cult to explore issues that are not contained 
within the prior assumptions of the researcher. It has a limited capacity to examine 
reasoning processes or the meanings individuals attach to particular concepts. 
Questions are typically answered through choice between pre-coded categories, with 
the risk of misunderstanding the language and that respondents may have no strong 
opinions on the issue or answers to meet what they understand as the interviewer’s 
expectations (Goerres and Prinzen, 2011). Discursive and interactive rather than 
pre-structured methods are better equipped to capture attitudes about complex issues 
which people may not have thought through and on which their conceptual framing 
may difer from that of the experts who designed the questionnaire. 
Focus groups allow individuals to express their opinions within a moderated group 
discussion of 45 minutes to one hour on a particular subject, typically according 
to a set of sub-themes listed in the moderators’ topic guide. The procedure allows 
people to describe, share and debate meanings, but provides limited opportunities to 
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develop them or to move away from the initial topic (Finch and Lewis, 2003). The 
DF approach seeks to re-balance control over data-gathering between participants and 
researchers. The topic is usually deined broadly and shaped by the participants rather 
than by a facilitator. Typically, there is a degree of light-touch moderation, in order 
to keep the discussion to a broad theme, but no predeined topic guide or schedule. 
The discussion is framed by participants, and researchers play a more passive role. 
There may be injections of relevant information, but these are typically provided in 
response to requests from the group and are prepared by independent experts who are 
available for cross-examination. The assumption is that people experiencing an issue 
are the best experts on their own understanding of it (Wakeford, 2007; Wakeford and 
Singh, 2008; Narayan, 2000). The group may be asked to agree a report to provide 
a focus and point to the discussion. 
Political and social scientists have become interested in this method for two reasons. 
First, conceptions of democracy have shifted away from that of a system for managing 
consent from a largely passive electorate to one of democracy as an active institutional 
framework for promoting more widespread deliberation and citizen engagement 
(Moufe, 2009; Chambers, 2003; Carpini et al, 2005; Dryzek, 2010). Second, some 
social psychologists have moved away from a positivist understanding of attitudes as 
original to an independent individual to one which sees them as social constructs, 
developed through interaction and expression in debate (Brown, 2011). From this 
perspective, interview responses in structured surveys are inevitably shaped by the 
interaction between a researcher and an interviewee. Conversely DF discussions are 
the product of a group interaction between naïve citizens.
The strengths of DFs are that they allow participants greater control over the way 
in which issues are deined and discussed than do structured surveys or, to some 
extent, than one-hour focus groups organised round a schedule of topics to which the 
moderator directs contributions. The approach requires that participants maintain an 
atmosphere of mutual respect, so that all points of view can be included and members 
are encouraged to participate. They allow researchers to examine the unprompted 
priorities of individuals in a broad topic-area. 
These strengths entail corresponding weaknesses. DFs are too small to permit fully 
representative sampling and so ofer an imprecise guide to the pattern of opinions 
across the population. They cannot be directed to consider speciic aspects of an issue 
according to a researcher’s system of priorities. They are best deployed in collaboration 
with other methods.
In this project we examine a general issue of considerable importance (attitudes 
to the medium-term future of the welfare state), where a number of factors interact 
to inluence change and where popular understanding of current developments and 
of how they afect people’s interests will have an impact. The studies referred to in 
the previous section show that many people feel concerned about the impact of 
immigration, the future of the labour market and the extent to which government 
policies are supporting their interests. Uncertainty is exacerbated by a growing distrust 
of politicians and experts (Rothstein, 2005; Ipsos-Mori, 2016). For these reasons 
DFs ofer an appropriate methodology for the work. DFs and the similar democratic 
polls (Fishkin, 2011) have been used in consultation exercises (Renn, 2008; Steiner, 
2012) but not, as far as we know, in welfare state attitude research.
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Method
We carried out a DF exercise in Birmingham in late 2015, after the May general 
election had brought in an austerity-focused majority Conservative government at 
the time when Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to avoid a referendum on EU 
membership by renegotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU.
Our UK research formed part of a ive-country comparative study on which we will 
report in future work (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). Participants were selected by 
a market research company with a screening questionnaire through door-knocking in 
contrasting areas. The group contained 34 people and achieved broad representation 
of the UK population by gender, age, family stage, ethnicity, work status and social 
class. All attended the full event and received a small inancial incentive. We also 
carried out a brief structured survey of the participants’ attitudes to welfare state 
issues using questions taken from the 2008 ESS questionnaire immediately before 
and after the DF meetings to identify areas in which opinions shifted as a result of 
discussion. The meetings took place over two days spaced two weeks apart. They 
were a mixture of plenary sessions and break-out group discussions in three groups 
of 11 to 12 participants to facilitate interaction. Prior to the event, participants were 
informed that the overarching question to be debated was the following:
What should priorities of the UK government in this country be for beneits 
and services in 2040?
This question was phrased in general terms to facilitate broad discussion. A brief 
explanation of the full range of services and beneits provided by the welfare state 
was given.
The irst one-day meeting consisted of a naïve discussion of the welfare state with 
no prior stimulus, so that participants could discuss and formulate themes which 
they considered most important. The ive themes selected were (in preference order): 
immigration; resources and sustainability (which in practice led to discussion of 
inequality and redistribution); population ageing; unemployment (which led to wider 
discussion of labour market issues); and poor access to education and opportunity 
(which many participants related to immigration, labour market issues and weaknesses 
in government policy). We then departed from strict DF protocol to add the topic of 
gender issues to the discussion, because we had agreed that this would be a common 
theme in the cross-national study mentioned earlier. In practice, and surprisingly, most 
gender issues (other than issues surrounding lack of childcare and women’s access to 
employment but including the gender pay gap) were seen as relatively unimportant 
by participants, despite their prominence in academic and policy debate. 
The group was given the opportunity to request further information at the end of 
Day One. It asked for factual material on immigration, resources and public spending 
on welfare, unemployment, population ageing and access to educational opportunities. 
This was gathered from ONS sources, distributed by email between the meetings 
and introduced and discussed at the beginning of the second day.
The second meeting took place after a two weeks’ gap, to give participants space 
to relect on the issues. Day Two was initially structured around the ive themes 
which formed the basis of the comparative study: immigration; income inequality; 
population ageing; unemployment and the labour market; and gender. The other 
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issues identiied by UK DF participants (resources and sustainability and education 
and training) emerged in the discussion of inequality and the labour market in 
any case. The themes of the research project corresponded fairly closely to those 
generated spontaneously in the irst day forum, apart from gender issues, but the 
stress by participants on resource problems and education as a pathway to opportunity 
may indicate strong concern about the former and high priority for the latter. The 
participants were asked to formulate policy recommendations on each of these 
themes, to ensure the discussion remained focused. Interactions were audio and 
video-recorded, with additional note-taking by three observers, so that all statements 
could be traced to speciic individuals. 
We coded the data in Nvivo starting from the ive issue areas identiied by 
participants, and then extending through iteration on the basis of topics emerging 
in the discourse. The questions of how a particular need should be addressed (by the 
individual, family, community, employer or the state), the extent to which people 
approved or disapproved of particular policies, the sources of evidence referred to, 
the justiication for a particular argument, the level of conlict in the group and the 
extent of attitude change were included, making a inal 21 codes.
Findings
The DFs provide a picture of attitudes to major changes facing the UK welfare state 
as our participants understood them and their desired policy responses. They also 
show how attitudes shifted (or failed to shift) as people discussed the issues. This is 
brought out in the comparison of the before and after surveys which summed up 
people’s individual views either side of the DF experience. The most noteworthy 
shifts are in relation to income inequality (more ind it acceptable), welfare state 
inancing (support for NHS and pensions but less conidence in sustainability) and 
immigration (stronger anti-immigrant sentiment). Attitudes correspond broadly to 
the BSA. In the irst two areas broadly speaking they reinforce the neoliberal agenda: 
majorities emphasise the work ethic and individual responsibility and see government 
as unable to provide decent services as time goes on.
Welfare state and the work ethic
Spending on those of working age and especially unemployed people was perhaps the 
most important issue raised in relation to the future sustainability of the welfare state. 
In reality beneits for unemployed people account for some 2 per cent of spending, 
for people on low incomes 17 per cent, for children 18 per cent, for disabled people 
18 per cent and for pensioners 45 per cent (IFS, 2014). Despite the fact that these 
statistics were presented in the stimulus material, most people stuck to their belief 
that unemployment beneits make up a very large proportion of welfare spending. 
Many of the participants expressed strong stigmatic beliefs about beneit abuse by 
unemployed people, following a neoliberal denigration of state welfare. 
‘Every time you drive past the Jobcentre on sign-on day they are outside 
standing with cans of beer at 10 o’clock in the morning.’ (P-51)
A beneits cap (at 25 per cent below average wage levels) was also strongly supported:
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‘We’d achieve this by saving money on beneits and giving this back to 
employers, who can pay this back in the form of a higher minimum wage.’ 
(P-81)
There is also some support for greater social equality and a lot of unease about 
conditions at the bottom of the labour market. Concern was expressed about zero-
hour contracts (although the only participant on such a contract said she valued 
lexibility in working hours) and about insecurity. The best way forward was seen in 
individual work ethic terms of a higher minimum wage and improved opportunities 
(further discussed in relation to education and the leading theme when the forum 
turned to future directions for welfare), rather than state redistribution through tax 
and beneits. In the inal recommendations, all agreed that zero-hours contracts 
should be abolished:
‘people on zero-hour contracts, they’re not entitled to the same things as 
permanent full-time employees…they don’t qualify for sick pay, there’s no 
guarantee of work, they’re not paying the…tax or National Insurance…they 
can’t get loans, they can’t get a mortgage, they don’t know when they’re 
working, they have really no say.’ (P-45)
There was extensive discussion of competition from immigrants for jobs (see the 
section on immigration, below) and this was the main reason most participants wanted 
immigration curtailed. Most believed that UK nationals should have labour market 
priority over immigrants, although after discussion on practicalities this was diluted to a 
right-to-interview for nationals. There was support for compulsory work-experience 
for all school-children and, following the individualist and opportunity-centred theme 
of the discussion, stronger regulation of trade unions.
Structured survey respondents express similar views. BSA 2014 respondents are 
much less keen on beneit spending for people of working age, especially unemployed 
people, than they are for spending on pensions or healthcare. There is strong and 
increasing concern that beneits reduce work incentives. Fifty-two per cent of BSA 
respondents believe that beneits for the unemployed are too high and discourage 
work while 27 per cent believe that they are too low and cause hardship, and, perhaps 
most important, only 18 per cent believe that the system encourages people to take 
paid jobs (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). In addition, a large majority (73 per 
cent) support a tight beneits cap. Similarly, in our DF before-and-after surveys, half 
of participants believed that social beneits and services tend to make people lazy, 
and 56 per cent believed that large inequalities are acceptable to reward talent and 
eforts. What was remarkable was that these statistics increased signiicantly to 71 per 
cent and 76 per cent respectively after the forum. There is a clear shift in attitudes 
towards a work-ethic opportunity society with greater inequalities and strict beneit 
constraints rather than a tax-and-spend redistributive welfare state. Participation in 
the debates strengthened the individualistic viewpoints of forum members.
Welfare state finance, sustainability and population ageing
The discussion of population ageing and intergenerational issues focused chiely on 
resource issues and on concerns about the sustainability of pensions, the NHS and 
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community care, again itting with a neoliberal mistrust in the capacity of the state 
to meet needs. The cost of beneits for people of working age, which bulked large 
in the minds of many participants (see discussion of unemployment below), was 
identiied (counterfactually) as the most important pressure on spending. However, 
it is clear that participants value highly what are in fact the major-spending state 
services (NHS and pensions), following a welfare state agenda. Despite this, they 
move to a neoliberal market-centred approach. While they regard state provision as 
highly, they also see it as unsustainable, as this interchange, to general assent, indicates:
‘That will be gone; the NHS will be gone in ive years.’ (P-80)
‘Yes, and that to me is just awful that we’ll lose that.’ (P-90)
‘If we keep doing what we’re doing the whole thing is going to be 
bankrupt…It will have to change, it’s got to change, but I mean, it’s the 
biggest gift that…I mean, it’s a thing of beauty, isn’t it?’ (P-80)
‘Absolutely, the best thing England’s ever introduced.’ (P-87)
Similarly, in another group:
‘The pensions are rubbish.’ (P-46)
‘I don’t think there will be a state pension in 2040.’ (P-42)
‘The state pension probably won’t exist. I think we are all in agreement on 
that.’ (P-68)
Among inal recommendations was an obligation for people to pay a percentage of 
their wage into a private pension scheme (only one participant disagreed) and support 
for healthier lifestyles to reduce NHS costs. 
Participants also repeatedly criticised the lack of transparency in government 
spending and felt the authorities should be more accountable, summed up in one 
group as follows: 
‘Somebody’s given £10, £15, £20 million, whether it be council or a 
government department, they’ve got to say what they’re spending the money 
on, where they’re spending the money and what are going to be the beneits 
to us as, as part of the society, yes, so there’s got to be more accountability…
and more transparency.’ (P-83)
In discussion of how funding shortfalls might be met there was little support for tax 
increases. Tax was discussed mainly in terms of tax evasion by large multinational 
corporations. A signiicant proportion of participants believed that high earners 
should not be taxed more:
‘I feel quite strongly, if you are bettering yourself: why should you pay twice 
as much tax as other people? It’s your money, you’re earning it.’ (P-44)
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Most participants, however, supported pay ceilings for high earners in large 
corporations (with only two disagreeing). 
The earlier discussion of sustainability led to recommendations for pension 
privatisation, but the area is clearly one of tension. In relation to population ageing, 
the real concern about sustainability of pensions was relected in a recommendation 
from one breakout group to increase the retirement age to between 70 and 75 and 
sharply cut funding for state pensions, provoking substantial disagreement in the inal 
plenary. Similarly, the idea of abolishing the state pension and making private pensions 
compulsory was controversial, with one of the three break-out groups arguing for 
retention of at least some state pension provision funded by higher national insurance 
contributions (‘it’s a safety net for everyone, you know, you need that’ (P-47)).
The other two groups were in favour of means-testing and privatisation to contain 
the pressures on the state of an ageing population:
‘It’s going to be a totally diferent system in 25 years’ time than it is today…
it’s just going to be impossible.’ (P-86)
‘It’s straightforward, you’ve earnt this amount of money…we’re not going 
to be paying you a pension.’ (P-48) 
‘Yes, we’ve got to shift that thought process…away from relying on beneit 
and state pension.’ (P-62)
Structured survey data shows a similar picture of concern about welfare state costs, 
with somewhat more enthusiasm for state provision in pensions, healthcare and 
education. Most people in the UK think the government should be responsible for 
and provide generous pensions and healthcare but there is real concern about the 
future. BSA shows about 70 per cent of respondents supporting higher spending on 
the NHS and pensions (Curtice and Ormston, 2015). Seventy-four per cent believed 
that the NHS faces a ‘major’ or a ‘severe’ funding problem. Only around a half (48 
per cent) believe that it ‘will still be paid for by taxes’ and be ‘free to all’ in a decade.
Similarly, DF participants agreed that pensions and healthcare should be a 
government responsibility, but were more pessimistic about the sustainability of the 
welfare state and supportive of cuts. The experience of taking part strengthened rather 
than weakened these attitudes. Seventy-four per cent thought that the NHS should 
be entirely a government responsibility before the DF, with 68 per cent for pensions. 
Corresponding statistics after the DFs were 32 and 38 per cent. Most people assumed 
that private responsibility would dominate. The reason for pessimism was clear: 56 
per cent stated that the UK would not be able to aford current levels of pensions in 
2040 before the DFs, rising to 79 per cent afterwards. 
A substantial group of DF participants were uncertain about spending policies 
before taking part in the discussions (37 per cent in favour of decreasing taxes at 
the cost of cutting social spending, against 23 per cent in favour of maintaining the 
status quo, and the plurality, 40 per cent, undecided). After the discussions more of 
the undecided group shifted to support more spending, but the balance remained in 
favour of cuts: 47 per cent against 40 per cent, with 13 per cent neutral, relecting the 
acceptance of the pressures but the valuing of pensions and the NHS. It can be seen 
that this is a nuanced neoliberalism – pro-welfare state in principle, but mistrustful 
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of state capacity in practice. In general, the future of the welfare state is seen as more 
market-centred. In relation to work, individual responsibility is valued. In relation 
to healthcare and pensions – the major services for those out of the labour market 
– the picture is more complex.
Immigration adds a further layer to the complexity of market-centred ideas.
Immigration
Immigration, selected as the most important topic by participants on Day One, is 
clearly a central issue, with a large majority endorsing much stricter border controls. 
This conlicts with an ideal typical neoliberalism that would value a free (and 
presumably globalised) market in labour (assuming immigrants are seen as primarily 
workers not beneit claimers) but its with ideas of individual responsibility that would 
include ensuring that people can protect themselves against competition from those 
who work for lower wages.
Most participants (who included three recent immigrants) believed that immigration 
is too high and (mistakenly – see Dustmann and Frattini, 2013) that current rates 
put severe strain on job opportunities and on housing, although some also pointed 
to beneits from immigration in diversity and the value of skilled workers to the 
economy and the NHS. Most people claimed that immigrants tended to put more 
pressure on the welfare state than denizens. All participants agreed that there should 
be a points-based system limiting immigration and this was prominent in the inal 
policy recommendations. Potential immigrants:
‘must have language, a promise of a job, be able to employ people, no health 
issues, no criminal record, money in the bank…Incomers need to bring 
something to the system.’ (P-70)
Participants argued for harsher policing of immigrants, for example, that immigrants 
should be tracked through ID cards, and that any conviction should result in 
deportation:
‘if [immigrants] come here and they are naughty, send them home.’ (P-72)
A minority of participants acknowledged that economic emigration should also 
be taken in consideration when discussing the introduction of immigration caps, 
especially with regard to a potential ‘brain drain’ and the need for skilled migrants:
‘British people are going to go and follow the money abroad so, we’re going 
to have to get other people in.’ (P-43)
This argument was incorporated in the inal recommendation for a points-based 
system, but did not afect the majority conviction that competition from immigrants 
was highly damaging to most people’s interests. 
The argument that immigrants’ rights to beneit should be severely curtailed 
corresponds to indings from the BSA Survey: 40 per cent of the 2014 BSA sample 
believe that immigrants from outside the EU should never receive UK beneits 
and 66 per cent that entitlement should be limited to six months; corresponding 
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attitude statistics for EU immigrants are 26 and 59 per cent (Taylor-Gooby and 
Taylor, 2015, Table 1). The before-and-after surveys for the DF indicate that the 
process of discussion shifted views against immigration. A majority (50 per cent 
before the event, 71 after) believed that immigrants should be granted rights to social 
beneits and services only after having worked and paid taxes for at least a year, and 
that immigrants tend to receive more than they contribute (47 per cent before, 56 
after). These are substantial shifts in the group and appeared to be inluenced by the 
arguments made by some participants which were based on personal experience of 
immigrant workers undercutting accepted pay rates.
The forum participants linked education and training to labour market and state 
responsibility in a way that casts further light on neoliberalism and the individual.
Training, education and social investment
Education and training opportunities were stressed by almost all forum participants 
as key to addressing problems of inequality and here the state was seen as having an 
important role and as able to make a major contribution. These themes emerged in 
relation to the topic of education and also in discussion of welfare state inancing, 
income inequality and unemployment issues. Participants also endorsed childcare but 
only for those who are in paid work or contribute to society through other means 
such as voluntary work. They took seriously the ‘new risk’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2004) 
issues of low pay and poor job opportunities, especially for young people and women 
with dependent children, despite current high employment. The emphasis by DF 
respondents its with the focus on individual as opposed to collective advance and 
the fact that redistributive policies played little part in the discussion.
Childcare was not extensively discussed as a major issue, although participants in 
two breakout groups called for more free or subsidised provision, including company 
crèches. Interestingly and again following the UK commitment to the work ethic, 
rather than any awareness of a potential beneit in child socialisation and early 
education, childcare was understood as a way to ensure that more parents were in 
paid work. Participants were reluctant to provide childcare for those who were not 
in the labour market:
‘I think ofer childcare to people who are working, the free childcare for 
people who are working, and should take it away from people.’ (UK-80)
‘Just take away from people who don’t work.’ (UK-88)
Education and training is endorsed because it allows those who make the efort to 
improve their lives as individuals within the more unequal system with weaker state 
provision that most participants see as inevitable. Many of the participants referred to 
apprenticeships as a positive policy and an expansion of apprenticeships was prominent 
on the inal list of priorities put forward at the end of the DF, to unanimous agreement:
‘if you have got the education and [do an] apprenticeship, you are getting 
paid, you feel like you are doing something and something is going back 
into society.’ (P-68)
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And also to encourage employers to develop human capital:
‘so invest in people, you know, see where their needs are, education, 
employment. They want to be more skilled, experienced. Like, you know 
big companies out there tell them to give people opportunities to develop 
themselves.’ (UK-46)
Such policies are not extensively discussed in the structured welfare state surveys, 
possibly because this area is often categorised by academics separately from the welfare 
state although policies in it inluence welfare outcomes. We did not anticipate the 
consistent emphasis on it across almost all DF participants and it was not included 
in our before-and-after surveys.
Discussion and conclusion: towards ‘reluctant individualism’?
This brief review of some of the most striking indings from the extended discussions 
in our DFs casts new light on what we know from structured surveys. Most people 
value the big-spending state services (especially the NHS and pensions) highly, but 
also stigmatise working-age beneit claimers and endorse individual responsibility. 
Two factors link these ideas to what might be seen as neoliberal individualism: 
most people misunderstand costs, exaggerating the scale of spending on working-
age beneits over that on healthcare and pensions, and they mistrust the capacity of 
government to provide decent healthcare and pensions in the future, so that there 
will be little alternative to much greater individual responsibility in these areas too.
The indings also move beyond what structured surveys indicate in two ways: 
attitudes strengthen in both the areas mentioned above as a result of discussion. In 
addition, the widely-studied welfare chauvinism, that has been an important feature 
of UK political debate in recent years, is strengthened in a way that conlicts with 
pure free market neoliberalism but its with individual determination to provide for 
self and dependents through paid work.
The impression of individual responsibility so far as the world of work goes is 
further reinforced by another inding: the fact that collective approaches to social 
issues are largely absent from responses in the forums. Ways forward mentioned in 
the more than 40 hours of discussion included some state regulation (in relation to 
immigration, stricter beneit regimes, enforcement of tax rules on multinational 
companies, requirements for employers to provide pensions, employ or interview UK 
nationals, and provide good afordable childcare, and banning zero-hour contracts). 
There were very few references to positive interventionist policies involving higher 
tax to expand state services or inance redistribution. Strikingly, there was no mention 
of other collective institutions such as trade unions or local government or even 
the voluntary sector as potential providers. These institutions tended to be seen as 
obstacles to the pursuit of individual opportunities.
In relation to the four research questions listed earlier (to do with the extent of 
individualism in UK welfare attitudes, the relationship with immigration attitudes, 
the particular issue of individualism and mass services and expectations for the future), 
the DFs endorse but build on existing knowledge. There is a committed and often 
enthusiastic individualism in labour market attitudes. People should be responsible 
for earning a living and too many people are seen to be work-shy, something which 
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welfare beneits are believed to encourage. Immigrants are often an extra burden on 
the welfare state and in any case generate unfair competition for those who strive 
honestly to support themselves in the labour market. However, the individualism 
which sees a much greater role for personal responsibility and privatisation in relation 
to the NHS and pensions is less whole-hearted. Most people in fact regard state 
provision as highly desirable, but think that the state will not be able to sustain it. This 
move towards a regretful individualism we term ‘reluctant individualism’, a converse 
to Keynes’s ‘reluctant collectivism’ (George and Wilding, 1985).
The DFs also take our understanding of neoliberal individualism in a more 
positive direction. Endorsement of individual responsibility extends to a demand 
for state engagement in helping and supporting people into decently-paid work 
through education and especially training summed up in the keenness with which 
apprenticeships were endorsed throughout the discussion, emerging as the area of 
strongest consensus in the inal plenary session. This links up with support for childcare 
(limited to families who contribute back to society through paid or voluntary work) 
which follows the logic of ‘social investment’ (Morel et al, 2012). It also suggests 
a shift in welfare efort away from older people (the current lion’s share of welfare 
state spending) to younger age groups, provided they are actively pursuing or are in 
paid work.
The DF approach contributes to research on welfare state attitudes in three ways. It 
adds to the range of methods available and ofers opportunities to examine how people 
link ideas and frame issues conceptually. Second, it enhances knowledge by taking 
forward that understanding of frameworks and in particular by showing how individual 
views in areas of initial majority opinion tend to strengthen through discussion to 
form a larger and more consensual majority view. Third, it helps develop theory, 
in this case by revealing some of the complexity of broadly individualist attitudes. 
Alongside the market individualism that promotes a work ethic lies a more reluctant 
individualism to do with the perception that state welfare faces major challenges and 
that individual responsibility in some areas is the only way forward. In addition, the 
individualism extends to the rejection of labour market competition from immigrants 
contra the principles of a free market. Also, most people see a role for government in 
regulating multinational corporations and developing active programmes to enhance 
opportunities for those who pursue them through interventions in education and 
training to improve prospects for workers and especially for younger people.
References
Alesina, A. and Glaeser, E. (eds) (2004) Fighting poverty in the US and Europe, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Atkinson, A. (2007) The distribution of earnings in OECD countries, International 
Labour Review, vol 142, no 2, pp 41–60.
Baldwin, P. (1990) The politics of social solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Baumberg, B., Bell, K. and Gafney, E. (2012) Beneits stigma in Britain, London: 
Elizabeth Finn Care.
Baumberg-Geiger, B., Reeves, A. and de Vries, R. (2017) Tax avoidance and beneit 
manipulation, in E. Clery, J. Curtice and R. Harding (eds) British Social Attitudes 
34, London: NatCen.
Identifying attitudes to welfare through deliberative forums
15
Blekesaune, M. and Quadagno, J. (2003) Public attitudes toward welfare state policies: 
A Comparative analysis of 24 nations, European Sociological Review, vol 19, no 5, 
pp 415–427.
Bonoli, G. and Natali, D. (2012) The politics of the new welfare state, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Brown, R. (2011) Group processes, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Burkhardt, C., Martin, R., Mau S. and Taylor-Gooby, P. (2011) Difering notions 
of social welfare?, in J. Clasen (ed)Converging worlds of welfare?, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp 15–32.
Carpini, M., Cook, F.L. and Jacobs, L. (2005) Public deliberation, discursive 
participation and citizen engagement, Annual Review of Political Science, vol 7, pp 
315–344.
Chambers, S. (2003) Deliberative democracy theory, Annual Review of Political Science, 
vol 6, pp 307–326.
Chung, H. and Meuleman, B. (2017) European parents’ attitudes towards public 
childcare provision: The role of current provisions, interests and ideologies, European 
Societies, vol 19, no 1, pp 49–68.
Clery, E. (2016) Welfare, in British Social Attitudes, 33, www.bsa.NatCen.ac.uk/latest-
report/british-social-attitudes-33/welfare.aspx 
Coughlin, R. (1980) Ideology, public opinion and welfare policy, Berkeley, CA: Berkeley 
University Press.
Curtice, J. (2010) Thermostat or weathervane?, in A. Park, J. Curtice, K. Thomson, M. 
Phillips, E. Clery and S. Butt. (ed) British Social Attitudes 26, London: Sage.
Curtice, J. and Ormston, R. (2015) Five years of coalition government, British Social 
Attitudes 32, www.bsa.NatCen.ac.uk/media/38973/bsa32_keyindings.pdf 
Dryzek, J. (2010) Foundations and frontiers of deliberative governance, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2013) The Fiscal Efects of Immigration to the UK, 
London: Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, DP 22/13, http://www.
cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/ CDP_22_13.pdf accessed 11.1.2018.
Christian, C., Frattini, T. and Preston, I. (2013) The efect of immigration along the 
distribution of wages, The Review of Economic Studies, vol 80, no 1, pp 145–173.
Elstub, S. (2015) A genealogy of deliberative democracy, Journal of Democratic Theory, 
vol 2, no 1, pp 100–117.
Elstub S. and McLaverty, P. (eds) (2014) Deliberative democracy: Issues and cases, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press.
Emmenegger, P. (2012) The age of dualization, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The three worlds of welfare capitalism, Cambridge: Polity.
Eurostat (2017) Social protection explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/0/05/Means-tested_social_protection_beneits%2C_2013.png 
Finch, H. and Lewis, J. (2003) Focus groups, in J. Ritchie and J. Lewis (eds) Qualitative 
research practice, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp 170–198.
Fishkin, J. (2011) When the people speak, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
George, V. and Wilding, P. (1985) Ideology and social welfare, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Glennerster, H. (2009) Understanding the inance of welfare, Bristol: Policy Press.
Goerres, A. and Prinzen, K. (2011) Can we improve the measurement of attitudes 
towards the welfare state?, Social Indicators Research, vol 109, no 3, pp 515–534.
Peter Taylor-Gooby et al
16
Gough, I. (2011) Welfare cuts, in K. Farnsworth and Z. Irving (eds) Social policy in 
challenging times, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 49–64.
Green, F. (2006) Demanding work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hemerijk, A. (2013) Changing welfare states, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hobolt, S. (2016) The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol 23, no 9, pp 1259–1277.
IFS (Institute for Fiscal Studies) (2014) A survey of the GB beneit system, IFS 
Brieing Note BN13 www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN13_Beneits_
Survey_2014.pdf 
Ipsos-Mori (2016) Veracity index, www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
researcharchive/3685/
Iversen, T. and  Wren, A. (1998) Equality, employment, and budgetary restraint, World 
Politics, vol 50, no 4, pp 507–546.
King’s Fund, The (2017) Does the NHS need more money?, www.kingsfund.org.uk/
publications/articles/big-election-questions-nhs-money 
Korpi, W. (1983) The democratic class struggle, London: Routledge.
Kriesi, H,, Grande, E,, Dolezal., M, Helbling, M., Hoglinger, D., Hutter, S. and Wuest, 
B. (2012) Political conlict in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kumlin, J. and Svallfors, S. (2012) Class, values, and attitudes towards redistribution: 
A European comparison, European Sociological Rreview, vol 29, no 2, pp 156–167.
Larsen, C. (2008) The institutional logic of welfare attitudes, Comparative Political 
Studies, vol 41, no 2, pp 145-168. 
Lupton, R., Burckhardt, T., Hills, J., Stewart, K. and Vizard, P. (eds) (2016) Social policy 
in a cold climate, Bristol: Policy Press.
Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and social class and other essays, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Mau, S. (2015) Inequality, marketization and the majority class, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Mewes, J. and Mau, S. (2013) Globalization, socio-economic status and welfare 
chauvinism, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol 54, no 3, pp 228–245.
Migration Observatory (2016) UK Public Opinion toward Immigration, http://
www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/brieings/uk-public-opinion-
toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/ accessed 11.1.2018.
Miller, D. (1976) Social justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morel, N., Palier, B. and Palme, J. (2012) Towards a social investment welfare state?, Bristol: 
Policy Press.
Moufe, C. (2009) The democratic paradox, London: Verso.
Narayan, D. (2000) Voices of the poor, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
NatCen (2017) British social attitudes, www.bsa.NatCen.ac.uk/ 
OBR (Office for Budget Responsibility) (2014) Welfare trends report, http://
budgetresponsibility.org.uk/docs/dlm_uploads/Welfare_trends_report_2014_
dn2B.pdf
OBR (Oice for Budget Responsibility) (2015) Fiscal sustainability report, http://
budgetresponsibility.org.uk/docs/dlm_uploads/49753_OBR-Fiscal-Report-Web-
Accessible.pdf 
Ofe, C. (1984) Contradictions of the welfare state, London: Hutchinson.
Identifying attitudes to welfare through deliberative forums
17
ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2017) Quarterly UK public services 
productivity (experimental statistics): April to June 2017, www.ons.gov.uk/
employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/labourproductivity/articles/
quarterlypublicserviceproductivityexperimentalstatistics/apriltojune2017 
Palier, B. (2010) A long goodbye to Bismarck?, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Pearce N. and Taylor E. (2013) Government spending and welfare, in British Social 
Attitudes 30, www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-30/
spending-and-welfare/introduction.aspx 
Pierson, P. (2001) The new politics of the welfare state, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reeskens, T. and van Oorschot, W. (2017) Conceptions of citizenship and tolerance 
towards migrants, in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds) The strains of commitment, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Renn, O. (2008) Risk, London: Earthscan.
Rothstein, B. (2005) Social traps and the problem of trust, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Scharpf, F. and Schmidt, V. (eds) (2000) Welfare and work in the open economy: Volume 
I, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, J. and Cleary, A. (2013) Gender roles: An incomplete revolution?, British Social 
Attitudes 30, www.bsa.NatCen.ac.uk/media/38457/bsa30_gender_roles_inal.pdf 
Steiner, J. (2012) The foundations of deliberative democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Svallfors, S. (2010) Public attitudes, in F.G. Castles, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger and 
C. Pierson (eds) The Oxford handbook of the welfare state, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp 241–251.
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1985) Public opinion, ideology and the welfare state, London: Routledge.
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) New Risks, New Welfare, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor-Gooby, P. and Leruth, B. (2018) Attitudes, aspirations and welfare, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan.
Taylor-Gooby, P. and Martin, R. (2010) Fairness, Equality and Legitimacy: a qualitative 
comparative study of Germany and the UK, Social Policy and Administration, vol 44, 
no 1, pp 85–103.
Taylor-Gooby, P. and Taylor, E. (2015) Beneits and welfare, British Social Attitudes 32, 
www.bsa.NatCen.ac.uk/media/38977/bsa32_welfare.pdf 
Taylor-Gooby, P., Leruth, B. and Chung, H. (2017) After austerity, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Telegraph (2010) David Cameron, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/6961675/
David-Cameron-net-immigration-will-be-capped-at-tens-of-thousands.html
Teney, C., Lacewell, O. and De Wilde, P. (2013) Winners and losers of globalization 
in Europe, European Political Science Review, vol 6, no 4, pp 575–595.
Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T, and Meer, A. (2011) European multiculturalisms, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Van Der Waal, J., De Koster, W. and Van Oorschot, W.  (2013) Three worlds of welfare 
chauvinism?, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, pp 1–18
Van Kersbergen K. and Vis, B. (2014) Comparative welfare state politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Van Oorschot, W. (2006) Making the diference in social Europe, Journal of European 
Social Policy, vol 16, 1, pp 23–42.
Peter Taylor-Gooby et al
18
Wakeford, T. (2007) The jury is out, in P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds) The Sage 
handbook of action research, London: Sage, pp 333–349.
Wakeford, T. and Singh, J. (eds) (2008) Towards empowered participation, Participatory 
Learning and Action 58 (June), London: International Institute for Environment and 
Development.
